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The unrelenting rise of antimicrobial
resistance (AMR) constitutes a serious
threat to health worldwide. In the last
decade, challenging multi-resistant bacteria
have expanded while new antimicrobial
drug development has lagged [1] with little
coordinated containment action at the
global level. Of significant concern has
been the emergence of vancomycin-resis-
tant Staphylococcus aureus, extensively drug-
resistant (XDR)-tuberculosis, and carbape-
nem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE).
AMR in both humans and animals
represents a complex global concern that
must be addressed ‘‘urgently and aggres-
sively’’ [2]. The International Health
Regulations (IHR), a legally binding agree-
ment between 194 States Parties [3],
deserve critical examination with regard
to their applicability to AMR. Using the
example of CRE as point of departure, we
analyze and discuss the potential role of the
IHR with respect to AMR.
The Public Health Risk Posed by
CRE
Enterobacteriaceae, a family that in-
cludes common pathogens responsible for
a large spectrum of disease, have been
sensitive to many antibiotics in the past.
Since the 1980s, the global spread of
extended-spectrum b-lactamase (ESBL)-
producing Enterobacteriaceae has limited
therapeutic options, but until recently,
carbapenems were still a reliable treatment.
The recent emergence of CRE, resistant to
most classes of antibiotics, has necessitated
the use of third-line agents and combina-
tion therapy with doubtful therapeutic
efficacy and increased toxicity [4].
Klebsiella pneumoniae harboring KPC
(KPC-Kp) have become endemic in parts
of the United States, China, Israel, and
Greece [4]. KPC-Kp have been imported
from the United States to Israel, and from
Israel to Colombia, the United Kingdom,
and Greece. International spread of KPC-
Kp from Greece has occurred to at least
nine European countries since 2007 with
further transmission documented in four of
them (Table 1 and Figure S1). CRE-
producing metallo-b-lactamases of the
VIM family have become highly prevalent
in Greece since their first detection in 2001
and spread to other countries in Europe
and America [5]. NDM-1-producing CRE
likely originated in India or Pakistan and
have spread to four continents [6,7].
CREhavebeenassociatedwithincreased
mortality and morbidity, and higher treat-
ment costs, when compared to infections
caused by susceptible strains [8,9], and have
the potential to considerably increase the
risk associated with routine medical proce-
dures. Although CRE have emerged in
hospitals, they will eventually spread to the
community, similar to ESBL-producing
Enterobacteriaceae, resulting in untreatable
common infections in otherwise healthy
individuals. CRE, particularly NDM-1, are
alreadyprevalentinthecommunityinIndia
and Pakistan [6].
The alarming spread of CRE is juxta-
posed against our failure to develop new
effective antimicrobials. The utility of
tigecycline is marred by high rates of
resistance among CRE [6] and a recent
FDA safety warning [10]. The usefulness
of colistin, the last drug with reliable in
vitro activity, is limited by toxicity, mod-
erate efficacy, and emergence of resistance
[6]. Currently, not a single new agent to
treat CRE infections is on the horizon.
These observations suggest that the inter-
national spread of CRE constitutes a
‘‘cause for worldwide concern’’ [11].
The Shortcomings of Global
AMR Surveillance and Control
Surveillance of AMR-pathogens such as
CRE is patchy and limited by financial and
technical constraints in large parts of the
world. In some high-income countries,
AMRdataarecompiled by publicly funded
surveillance networks such as EARS-Net, a
network of national surveillance systems in
Europe, or by pharmaceutical company-
sponsored surveys. Informal networks, such
as ProMED, also collect information,
although selectively and with a consider-
able time lag. This holds even truer for the
scientific literature.
ImprovingAMRsurveillanceisoneofthe
key recommendations in a recent report [2].
Without a global early warning system, the
spread of AMR often remains unnoticed
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Although data from Israel indicate that the
countrywide adoption of enhanced hospital
infection control measures was effective in
reducing endemic KPC-Kp transmission,
early proactive surveillance and contain-
ment strategies are more effective and much
less costly [12]. In view of the shortcomings
of the current patchwork, a coordinated
response using a global framework for
surveillance and enhanced infection control
of CRE and other emerging XDR-patho-
gens is needed.
The Potential Role of the IHR
The IHR provide a legal framework for
international efforts to contain the risk
from public health threats that may spread
between countries, including surveillance
and global alerts (Articles 5–11), definition
of core public health capacities for surveil-
lance and response in all countries (Arti-
cles 5, 13), and World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) guidance through ‘‘standing
recommendations’’ (Articles 16, 53) [3].
In order to identify events that have the
‘‘potential to cause international disease
spread’’, WHO is bound to collect epide-
miologic information ‘‘through its surveil-
lance activities’’ (Article 5), notifications
from affected countries (Article 6), and
reports from third parties (Article 9) [3]. A
set of criteria defined in Annex 2 of the
Regulations (Figure 1) is used to determine
whether an event ‘‘may constitute a public
health emergency of international con-
cern’’ (PHEIC) and ‘‘potentially requires a
coordinated international response’’ [3].
The determination of a PHEIC constitutes
a second and independent step from the
notification process and falls within the
purview of the Director-General of WHO.
We argue that certain events marking
the emergence and international spread of
KPC and NDM-1-producing CRE, espe-
cially those involving new pan-resistant
Summary Points
N The public health threat of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is growing and needs
to be addressed urgently.
N The International Health Regulations (IHR), a legally binding agreement
between 194 States Parties, whose aim is to prevent, protect against, control,
and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease,
deserve critical examination with regard to their applicability to AMR.
N We argue that the emergence and spread of antimicrobial-resistant bacteria,
especially those involving new pan-resistant strains for which there are no
suitable treatments, may constitute a public health emergency of international
concern (PHEIC) and are notifiable to the World Health Organization under the
IHR notification requirement.
N The use of the IHR framework could considerably improve our response to
emerging AMR threats like carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE).
N As more governments start to take the threat of pan-resistant bacteria seriously,
there is a window of opportunity for having a healthy debate about the
applicability of the IHR to AMR.
Table 1. Transmission of carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae from Greece to other European countries, 2007-2010.
Country Year
Total Number
of Patients
Origin of
Patients
Number of
Secondary
Cases
Probability of
the Greek Origin References
Mechanisms of
Resistance
Belgium 2009 3 3 patients transferred
from Greek hospitals
0 Confirmed Bogaerts et al. 2010
[19]
blaKPC-2
Denmark 2009 2 2 patients transferred
from Greek hospitals
0 Confirmed Hammerum et al. 2010
[20]
blaKPC-2
Finland 2009 1 1 patient transferred
from Crete
0 Confirmed Osterblad et al. 2010
[21]
blaKPC-2
France No data 8 1 patient transferred
from Crete
7 Confirmed Naas et al. 2010 [22] blaKPC-2
France 2007 1 1 patient transferred
from Crete
0 Confirmed Cuzon et al. 2008 [23] blaKPC-2
France 2009 1 1 patient transferred
from Greek hospital
0 Confirmed Barbier et al. 2010 [24] blaKPC-2
France 2009 4 1 patient transferred
from Greek hospital
3 Confirmed Kassis-Chikhani et al.
2010 [25]
blaKPC-2
Germany 2007-2008 9 1 patient treated in
Greece
8 Hypothetical Wendt et al. 2010 [26] blaKPC-2
Hungary 2008 7 1 patient transferred
from Greek hospital
6 Confirmed To ´th et al. 2010 [27] blaKPC-2
Norway 2007 6 4 patients transferred
from Greek hospitals
2 Confirmed Samuelson et al. 2009
[28]
blaKPC-2
Sweden No data 1 1 patient transferred
from Greek hospital
0 Confirmed Tegmark Wisell et al.
2007 [29]
blaKPC-2
The Netherlands No data 14 African immigrants
travelling via Greece
No data Hypothetical Meessen et al.
2010 [30]
blaKPC-2
The Netherlands No data 1 1 patient transferred
from Greek hospital
No data Confirmed Cohen Stuart et al.
2010 [31]
blaKPC-2
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001022.t001
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treatments and which are of major public
health importance, can be considered to
fulfil at least two Annex 2 criteria, in
particular ‘‘serious public health impact’’
and ‘‘international spread’’ (Table 2), and
should therefore be notified to WHO.
This argument has, in fact, been made for
XDR-tuberculosis and can be extrapolat-
ed to other types of significant new or
emerging extensively or pandrug-resistant
pathogens such as artemisinin-resistant
Plasmodium falciparum. ‘‘New or emerging
antibiotic resistance’’ is one of the exam-
ples listed in Annex 2 for application of the
first criterion.
Still, due to the nonspecific nature of
Annex 2 and limited WHO guidance,
some may counter that CRE (and other
AMR) events are irrelevant to the IHR.
In a recent survey among National IHR
Focal Points, a scenario describing a fatal
hospital outbreak caused by pan-resistant
K. pneumoniae was considered notifiable by
just over half of respondents [13]. One of
the main arguments against applying the
IHR to AMR events is that ‘‘the IHR are
really intended for outbreaks of acute
disease’’ [14] rather than ‘‘acute-on-
chronic’’ events like the relatively slow
but relentless spread of AMR. However,
we would counter that this reasoning is
inconsistent with the explicitly stated
purpose of the IHR ‘‘to prevent, protect
against, control and provide a public
health response to the international
Figure 1. International Health Regulations (IHR) 2005 decision instrument for the assessment and notification of events that may
constitute a public health emergency of international concern (simplified from Annex 2 of the IHR).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001022.g001
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commensurate with and restricted to
public health risks, and which avoid
unnecessary interference with internation-
al traffic and trade’’[3].
Why Should the IHR Be Applied to
the Global AMR Threat?
The global threat posed by the spread of
AMR cannot be addressed by individual
countries alone, but requires a coordinated
international response. Recognizing the
applicability of the IHR to AMR will serve
as a ‘‘wake-up call’’ and strengthen global
AMR surveillance and response, which
could in turn contribute to containing the
spread of AMR. While WHO has initiated
several networks and provides guidance
for reporting AMR, including WHONET,
none function as an early warning system.
Although very few AMR events would be
determined a PHEIC by the Director-
General, notifications of events that fulfil
the Annex 2 criteria could serve as alerts
and could be an important instrument in
the chain of ‘‘the global early warning
function, the purpose of which is to
provide international support to affected
countries and information to other coun-
tries if needed’’ [15]. The immediate
consequence of notification is to initiate
an ‘‘exclusive dialogue between the noti-
fying State Party and WHO concerning
the event at issue’’ [15] and to make a joint
risk assessment. Once an event has been
notified to WHO, and it is not determined
to be a PHEIC, WHO can communicate
this information to other countries (Article
11). The dissemination of information
through the WHO Event Information
System (EIS) could expediently increase
awareness in multiple countries, allow
early implementation of screening mea-
sures for persons at risk (e.g., international
hospital transfers), and prevent the estab-
lishment of new resistant strains in unaf-
fected countries. Based on the experience
in Greece and Israel, Carmeli et al.
recommend that countries ‘‘should be
made aware of the problem and should
have a preparedness plan ready for
implementation at a national level’’ [16].
By authorizing WHO to make ‘‘standing
recommendations’’ (Article 16), the IHR
could facilitate the international dissemi-
nation of appropriate measures to counter
the spread of AMR.
Importantly, the IHR focuses on a
societal investment in core surveillance
and response capacities at different levels
by setting minimum standards. WHO
pledges to collaborate with the States
Parties concerned ‘‘by providing technical
guidance and assistance and by assessing
the effectiveness of the control measure in
place, including the mobilization of inter-
national teams of experts for on-site
assistance, when necessary’’. This is rele-
vant for the spread of AMR given the
importance of appropriate infection con-
trol measures. While details of these
measures need to be more closely defined,
it is clear that the application of the IHR
framework is invaluable for a coordinated
global approach to AMR.
What Are the Obstacles to Apply the
IHR to the Global Spread of AMR?
Even if WHO and a majority of States
Parties considered that AMR should be
addressed under the IHR, technical,
financial, and political obstacles might
interfere. Notification of an event to
WHO depends on it being detected
(requiring a functioning health system
and adequate laboratory capacities), and
reported to the National IHR Focal Point.
There is concern that many States Parties
are far from being compliant with the
IHR’s minimum core capacity require-
ments for surveillance and response. Even
if relevant information filters through to
the national level, notification decisions
may be under political control. The fierce
reaction of the Indian government to
claims that NDM-1-producing CRE iso-
lated in the UK originated in India casts
doubt on the willingness of governments to
report the existence of such events, in
particular if economic interests (such as the
income from medical tourism) are at stake.
These obstacles are not specific to AMR-
related events, and cannot serve as an
argument against the application of the
IHR in this context.
The final obstacles are a lack of expertise
and capacities within WHO. Although
WHO vertical programs have successfully
focused on drug resistancein selected areas,
including malaria and tuberculosis, WHO
arguably does not have the means to
comply with its IHR mandate of offering
assistance to States Parties affected by the
spread of multi-resistant bacteria. The
dearth of leadership in this area was the
object of a WHO resolution in 2005, but it
has been commented that ‘‘very little has
taken place to implement the resolution
WHA 58.27 since its passage’’ [17]. During
the last World Health Assembly, the
Swedish Health Minister commented that
‘‘there is an increasing awareness about this
major health threat, but far from enough
Table 2. Arguments in favour of and against the applicability of Annex 2 criteria to new CRE events.
Criterion Pro Contra
Is the public health impact
of the event serious?
N The spread of CRE has a high potential for future impact on public
health. ‘‘Public health impact weighs both the immediate and
potential future consequences of an event on the health of human
populations’’ [15], although it is not clear whether ‘‘future’’ refers
to short-term or long-term consequences.
N Treatment failure associated with AMR is one of the
‘‘circumstances that contribute to high public health impact’’
listed in Annex 2 [3].
N Not an immediate threat to public health; short-
term impact difficult to quantify. The increased
attributable morbidity and mortality is mostly
restricted to a minority group, i.e., hospitalized
patients. Low potential to cause visible community
epidemics compared to infections such as influenza,
cholera, or polio.
Is the event unusual or
unexpected?
N Novel resistance mechanisms, particularly pan-resistance,
are by definition unusual and unexpected.
N Selection of resistant pathogens is an expected
consequence of the use of antimicrobials.
Is there any significant risk
of international spread?
N Clear epidemiological links and cross-border movement
of individuals colonised or infected with CRE [7] (Table 1).
N The international spread of CRE is slow compared to
the acute risk to public health caused by respiratory
viruses.
Is there any significant risk
of international travel or
trade restrictions?
N In 2008/2009, Russia refused imports of pork and poultry products
based on the presence of antibiotic residues [32]; a similar reaction
to the presence of CRE in food items would not seem out of the
question in the context of increasing concern about AMR.
N In reality, no case of trade restrictions and no travel
restrictions due to CRE so far.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001022.t002
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needed in this area’’ [18].
IHR—A Call for Action
The IHR do not provide a panacea for
the problem of AMR. However, this
framework provides a global surveillance
infrastructure and orchestrates an appro-
priate public health response. The IHR are
ultimately ‘‘owned’’ by the States Parties,
some of whom increasingly understand the
extent and urgency of the threat posed by
AMR. However, it is up to WHO to
provideleadershipontheroleoftheIHRin
this matter. Further guidance on the
application of Annex 2 to this issue is
required. With the IHRin place,increasing
the capacities of this framework at all levels
to address AMR, rather than investing in
new vertical programs, seems logical. The
revival of the implementation of the WHO
2001 Global Strategy for the containment
of AMR with incorporation of the IHR
framework into the strategy is required.
Although this paradigm shift eventually
rests on the World Health Assembly and
StatesParties’willingnesstoadopt it,WHO
must demonstrate leadership in this regard.
Conclusion
The international dissemination of
AMR, typified by CRE, is a serious threat
for global health. Although the spread of
AMR is less dramatic than many acute
disease outbreaks, it significantly reduces
our therapeutic options and adds signifi-
cantly to the health care burden. A global
mechanism incorporating both systematic
surveillance and effective public health
response is urgently required. We would
argue that the IHR provide an appropri-
ate framework to coordinate efforts for
controlling the international spread of
AMR. Several obstacles need attention
before the full potential of the IHR may be
realized, but there is a window of oppor-
tunity for having a healthy debate about
the applicability of the IHR to AMR.
While States Parties and WHO share a
collective responsibility in the process,
WHO must clearly delineate its position
with regard to AMR and the intended role
of the IHR in this context.
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